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investments. Among other benefits, rural roads provide  related to household per-capita expenditures to assess
cheaper access  to both markets for agricultural output  their distributional consequences.
and for modern inputs.  The empirical analysis, using data from Nepal, shows
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nonparametrically estimating the benefits from road  areas, much of these gains going to poorer households.
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20433.I.  Introduction
Rural infrastructure is a major development priority (World Bank, 1994), yet little
is known about the size and especially the distribution of benefits from such investments in
LDCs.  The distribution issue is salient, not only in the formulation of policy, but also in
understanding the political constraints on the allocation of infrastructure investment.
Rural roads are an.  important form of public infrastructure, providing cheap access to both
markets for agricultural output and for modem inputs.  Given limited policy instruments
for reaching the remote rural poor, road-building would seem desirable on distributional
grounds.  On the other hand, the benefits of infrastructure projects accrue mainly to
landowners, who are generally  not among the very poor.  Thus, the extent to which rural
road construction ameliorates income inequality is ultimately an empirical question.'
In this paper, I examine the distributional consequences of rural roads using data
from Nepal, a country with a largely agrarian economy, a sparse highway network, and
extremely difficult  terrain. To this end, I develop an empirical methodology for
nonparametrically estimating  the household-specific benefits from alternative  road projects
using information on the value of farmland and distance to agricultural markets.  If land
behaves like a standard asset, which is a testable assumption, then its value equals the
discounted stream of maximal  profits from cultivation.  Hence, the income gains from
lower transport costs should be capitalized in land values.  With an estimate of the land
value-distance relationship  in hand, it is possible to describe the joint distribution of
hypothetical road project benefits anrd  household income.
'Howe  and Richards  (1984)  discuss  some  distributional  aspects  of rural  roads  and  present  case  studies.
Also,  van de Walle  (1996)  uses mnicro-data  and a profit function  approach  to examine  the distribution  of
benefits  from irrigation  in Viet  Nam.
1In principle, road benefits could also be estimated from the relationship  between
farm profits and distance to markets.  However, there are several difficulties  with this
approach, the most nettlesome of which is that survey data rarely, if ever, provide accurate
information on an essential component of profit, the cost of transporting goods and
agricultural inputs to and from markets.  Another difficulty is that profit (or production)
functions assume a fixed technology and thus cannot easily account for potential
adaptations of farmers to greater remoteness from markets, such as substitution of
traditional for modern inputs or away from transport-intensive crops. The relationship
between land value and distance to market is immune from such difficulties.
To be sure, the idea of using land values to estimate the average benefits of
infrastructure investments in a population is hardly new, though it has not to my
knowledge been applied to rural transport.  In any case, such estimates do not address the
primary question of this paper, which is a distributional one.  The innovation here is to link
a household-level benefit estimate with a measure of household income. In doing so, I
take a nonparametric approach.  While it is true that economic theory is largely silent on
the parametric form of hedonic price functions (see Stock, 1991), in practice, relaxing
parametric assumptions in hedonic models is much more likely to matter for distributional
questions than for questions about average benefits.
Theoretically, my analysis is based on the Ellet-Walters model of rural transport
(see Walters, 1968; Gersovitz, 1989), in which land rents decline with distance to markets
through the influence of distance on effective prices.  The model, laid out in the next
section, provides a simple characterization of the potentially conflicting  distributional
consequences of road projects.
2Section IiI discusses the nonparametric or, more precisely, semi-nonparametric
estimation of the land value equation.  Section IV describes the data, analyzes how farrner
behavior is influenced  by distance to market, and tests the appropriateness of a standard
asset-pricing model for land. Section V presents the main empirical results, the analysis of
land values and of the distribution of benefits from hypothetical road projects.  Section VI
concludes the paper.
II . Theoretical Framework
Basic Model
Farmers are assumed to cultivate a single crop using x kg per hectare of a modern
input, say chemical fertilizer, and  /  hours per hectare of labor.  Crop yield y  (kg per
hectare) is produced with a fixed technology represented by the neoclassical production
function y = f(x,  1). Let w be wage rate and  v~  and p  be the "effective" or farm gate
prices of output and fertilizer, respectively, discussed below.  Per hectare land rent, p,  is
defined as the maximal  profit that can be earned on a hectare of land,
p(w,v,p)-  max{py-wI-vx}  (1)
I.x
and can be thought of as a long-run average.
Effective prices are determined by the economic geography, which is illustrated in
Figure 1. A highway of arbitrary length through the countryside runs through a large city
where all fertilizer is produced and output is purchased.  The highway transects a series of
otherwise isolated mountain valleys along which all farms are located. This is a
convenient fiction, but not unlike the geography of Nepal.  The total cost of transporting
3goods between  farms  and the city  has two components:  a relatively  large cost of
headloading  goods (i.e.,  using human  porters) between  the farm and  the road and a
relatively  small  cost of trucking  goods along the road. All  farmers  trade agricultural
output and  fertilizer  in a competitive  market center located  at the road  juncture  with their
valley  (markets  at intermediate  points  up the valley  are an inessential  complication  since
goods must still  be headloaded  from the main highway). From a given  farm,  it takes h
hours to walk to the market  center and the portage cost of goods is b Rupees/(kg  hours),
where b is proportional  to the wage. If the money  prices of fertilizer  and output at a
particular  market  center  are v and p,  respectively,  then the effective  purchase  price  of
fertilizer  is v = v + bh Rupees/kg  and the effective  selling  price of output is p = p - bh
Rupees/kg. All  labor  can be obtained  locally  with zero transport  costs.
Unprofitable  land  will  not be cultivated,  so the limit  of cultivation  in terms of
walking  time to the market  center, h , is implicitly  defined  by p(h ;w, p, v) = 0 . As
figure 1 illustrates,  h  declines  across  valleys  as one moves  away  from the city,  because
p  declines  and v increases;  ultimately,  h  = 0 and all cultivation  ends.
As  to the relationship  between  land rent and travel time,  by the envelope  theorem
-b(y  + x)  for h < h-  (2)
So, the negative  rent gradient  is  just equal in magnitude  to the total transport  costs per
hour per hectare. Furthermore,  by the convexity  of the profit  function  in prices,
>  0  for h <  h  (3)
Thus, along  any  given  valley,  the rent function  is convex.
4Notice that convexity of the rent function does not require that farmers both
purchase fertilizer and sell output at the same time (though nonparticipation in the latter
market means that rents depend upon the endogenous  shadow price of output).  However,
if one moves far enough away from a market center, farmers may stop selling output and
buying fertilizer altogether, and the rent gradient would be zero beyond this point (and
thus the rent function not strictly convex).  Convexity is also robust to the assumption of a
single crop or production technology.  Figure 2 shows how the rent function along one of
the valleys in Figure 1 reflects the profit maximizing choice of available crops or
technologies; as travel time rises, farmers may switch away from bulkier crops or from
agricultural practices that are intensive in modem inputs.
Roads and Welfare
Using the above framework, consider the welfare implications  of building a road of
given length off of the main highway into a particular valley. The local scale of the project
ensures that it has no general equilibrium effects on wages or prices. To avoid specifying
the source of public finance, assume that the project is funded by earmarked foreign aid.
Let A denote the length of the road in foot-travel (hours walking time) equivalents. By
enabling truck transport, the road effectively cuts portage costs by some fraction ,u. The
new rent function, suppressing  its dependence on prices and on  ',u2 iS
2The  parameter  u  reflects  road  quality.  I  do not consider  the  welfare  cffects  of  variation  in  p because,  as
a practical  matter,  the cost  of upgrading  road  surface (from earth to gravel  or asphalt)  far outweighs  the
small reduction  in vehicle  operating  cost, once truck transport is feasible  (Beenhakker  and Lago, 1983).
Although  improvements  in road conditions,  given surface  type, can substantially  reeuce  vehicle  operating
cost,  these cost-savings  are likely  to be small compared  to those of a new road. Of course,  in the extreme
case where  an existing  road  is impassible  to trucks, a road improvement  is tantamount  to a new road.
5a(A,h) =  p(u)  forh <  (4)
=p(h-2(l-,u))  forhŽ>  (
Figure 3 illustrates  the rise in land  rents as a result of the project,  along  with the expansion
in the limit  of cultivation  h'.
An interesting  policy  question  concerns  the length  of the road, specifically  whether
it makes sense  to build  a lot of short roads or fewer long ones, given  a fixed  construction
budget. A key input  into this decision  is the marginal  social  benefit  of road length,  where
"society"  in this case  refers  to the farmers  in the typical  valley. Suppose  that household
income  z is determined  by farm  profit  (land rent) and labor  earnings,  the latter  which  is
assumed  fixed  across  households  for expository  purposes;  i.e., z = o(A,  h)A +  e, where A
is total landholdings  and  e is earnings. Let G(h, A) denote  the joint cumulative
distribution  function  for distance  from market center and landholdings.  Finally,  let y/(z)
be the increasing,  strictly  concave,  indirect  utility  function. Assuming  it is additive,  the
social  welfare  function  is
W(2)  f  j  (o-(Af(2,  h)A + e)dG(h,  A)  (5)
A
Notice that households  already  on a road do not benefit from its extension  further  up the
valley  (i.e., o-A  = 0 for h < A), so that differentiating  (5) with respect  to A yields
W'(2) = J  fV'adAdG(h,  A)  (6)
A
To illuminate  the distributional  issues, it is instructive  to  fix land area for the
moment  and to decompose  marginal  social  benefit  as follows
W'(2,A) = 11  - G(A1A)]{E[4  A,h >  A]E[cIA,  h> A] +Cov[|V,aAIA,h>  A]}A  (7)
6The first term in (7) is simply  the fraction of households living off the road.  The first term
in  the  curly brackets  is the  average  marginal  value  of  the road  extension for  these
beneficiaries, assuming their marginal utilities of income and appreciations in plot value are
uncorrelated.  The second term in curly brackets accounts for this correlation, which must
be  negative because  V"ohA  > 0  and  o,Ih <0 . In other  words, farther up the  valley,
where land rents are low and thus households are poorer, rents rise by less due to the road
extension.  The size of this "targeting inefficiency" depends crucially on the shape of the
rent ianction; indeed the covariance is zero if the rent function is linear in travel time.  In
sum, the marginal social benefit of a road extension is higher when: (i) the fraction of the
population living off-road is higher; (ii) the average off-road household is poorer (i.e., has
a higher  yV'  ); (iii) the off-road rent gradient is steeper; and (iv) the targeting inefficiency
(the covariance term) is smaller.
With land area variable the distributional issue becomes cloudier.  First, for any
given h, both the benefit from the road extension and household income are increasing in
landholdings. 3 W'hile  this effect exacerbates inequality, there is also an effect working in
the  opposite  direction.  It  is often the  case  in  developing countries, and Nepal  is no
exception, that poorer households are found in more remote areas, perhaps because poor
migrants settle on the frinees of cultivation  Tf  A and h are neeativelv correlated. then the
beneficiaries of a road extension (those off the original road) tend to be poorer, resulting
in a greater marginai social benefit than if A and h are uncorrelated.  Allowing earnings, e,
to vary in the population complicates matters further, but the basic point remains, namely
3 Note  that  in this  model  renters  do  not benefit  from  road  construction;  their  higher  rent  payments  just
offset  the  greater  profitability  of  the  land.
7that  road  construction has ambiguous distributional  effects.  The goal of the  empirical
work is to resolve this ambiguity  in the case of Nepal.
IH.  Econometric Specification
The theoretical analysis  is framed in terms of rents, but my data are on land values
at the plot level.  According  to the standard asset-pricing model
loa(V) = 1og(p(h;w,p,v))-  log(r)  (8)
whe. - V  is the present market value of a plot of land and r  is the constant discount rate.
Assume that this formula is valid, at least until it is tested in Section IV.
Besides negativity and convexity in h,  economic theory imposes no restrictions on
the form of p.  It is therefore desirable to estimate the rent function nonparametrically,
but this is not feasible when it includes many other variables besides h.  For example, any
plot characteristic, such as soil quality, that shifts the production function f  should also
shift the rent function p.  Additionally,  in the absence of accurate data on input and
output prices, geographic price variation can be swept out of the rent function by
including market center (regional) dummy variables. 5 A within-market analysis  also
ameliorates the problem of endogenous placement of roads and/or markets; in particular,
If farmers  are risk neutral,  then V =  E  to  ,  where Eo is the expectations  operator  conditional
on today's information set.  if it is further assumed that profits per hectare follow a random walk so that
Eo[pt+l  ] = Pt, then the formula  simplifies  to V = p/r,  where p = p0 (see Clark  et. al, 1993).
Strictly  speaking,  this procedure  is only  an approximation.  Since h enters  effective  prices linearly,
log(p) cannot be additively separable in money prices.  Even with accurate price data, it would be difficult
to impose the full structure of the theoretical model in the estimation of the rent function.  On the other
hand, given the relatively low cost of trucking, it is unlikely that price variation along the main highway
is sufficiently great to render this approximation  inaccurate.
8market centers may  be located closer  to more fertile  land, where rents are higher. Given
these considerations, I take a semi-nonparametric  approach by assuming  that
log(p) = log 0(h) + r' X +6' M,  where a  is a nonparametric  function,  X  is a vector of
plot characteristics,  and M  is a vector of regional dummy  variables.
As to the dependent variable  in (8), Colwell  and Munneke (1997) warn against
using land value per-hectare because plot values may be nonlinear in area.  If so, and if
parcel size is correlated with distance to market, then such a specification  will lead to a
spurious correlation between land value and distance. Including  the log of plot area, A,
to account for this nonlinearity  in the empirical  specification  of (8) gives
log(V) = logO(h) +,l1og(A) + y'X + 6'M  + u  (9)
which nests the value per-hectare specification  when /  = 1. Note, log O(h) absorbs
log(r),  and the error term, u, reflects unobserved attributes of the plot.
Following Robinson (1988) and Stock (1991), equation (9) can be estimated by
first using bivariate kernel regressions  to "partial out" h from both sides. Since the
number of kernell  regressions  required equals one plus the dimensionality  of ( A, X, M),
this method is computationally  very expensive,  especially  given the large sample. A much
cheaper approach uses the fact that h is a discrete valued regressor in the data with k
distinct values. In the first stage, I include a k - I vector of dummy  variables D  in (9) for
each value of h; i.e., I replace logO with co  =  kJDJ.  Applying  ordinary least squares
(OLS) to this regression yields a consistent estimate of (A, ry  8, O . In the second stage, I
calculate  t  for each observation  and run a nonparametric  regression of this variable
against h to get a smoothed estimate of 9.
9IV.  Data and Preliminary Analysis
Nepal Living Standards Survey
The data for this study come from the 1995-96 Nepal Living Standards Survey
(NLSS), a nationwide multi-topic survey collected by the Central Bureau of Statistics
assisted by the World Bank (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1995). A stratified random
sample of around 3400 households was drawn from four zones: Mountains, urban Hills,
rural Hills, and Terai.  Jn addition, a special sample of 1200 households was surveyed in
the Arun valley (rural Hills), which I include in my analysis.
The NLSS contains a detailed agricultural module including information on the use
of modern inputs, of which chemical fertilizer predominates, and on crop production and
saies-  In addition, the survey provides a listing of all plots owned or leased in by the
household along with information on plot area, land quality, irrigation by season, net rent
received by season (if leased out), and, of course, value of owned plots.  The question on
plot value reads as follows: "If you wanted to buy a plot exactly like this, how much
would it cost you?"  One indication of farmers' awareness of land values, besides the fact
that it is by far their most productive asset, is the frequency of land transactions, which is
surprisingly high in the sample. 6 Among the 3,621 landowning households, 5 percent
bought land the previous year and 9 percent either bought or sold land. Moreover,
although 85 percent of all plots are inherited, 28 percent of the landowning  households
purchased at least one of their current plots.  Note also that any nonsystematic
6Land  transactions are sparse in most contexts.  For this  reason many hedonic studies use self-assessed
land values (see, in particular, Mendelsohn, et al.,  1994 and the citations in Colwell and Munneke,  1997)
or housing values (see Bartik  and Smith, 1987).
10measurement error in plot values will not affect the coefficients of a regression in which
plot value is the dependent variable.
A unique feature of the NLSS questionnaire is that it collects information  at the
household level on access to 14 different facilities. For each facility,  the survey asks about
travel time (in minutes, hours, and days) and mode of transport; i.e., by foot (without
load), bicycle, motorcycle, car/bus, and mixed (foot+vehicle).  Keep in mind that
collecting data on actual distance, even using satellite telemetry, would be of little value in
moun 1tainous Nepal (except perhaps in the Terai).  However, I do not use the household-
level travel time information  directly. Instead, I take the median of travel times by
"wards" (in rural areas these are villages and environs) based on households that report
travel times by foot, which the great majority do.  The advantage of this procedure is that
it standardizes travel times for mode of transport, which is potentially endogenous, and it
mitigates the measurement error that is likely to be present in household level travel times.
I focus on market centers and agricultural cooperatives, since these facilities are
the most likely to offer the opportunity to sell output and purchase modem inputs.  In fact,
over two-thirds of the households who report using chemical fertilizers  obtained them
from agricultural cooperatives, and most of the rest from private traders.  My measure of
h is the minimum of ward- median travel times to the market center and agricultural
cooperative.  Ideally, travel times to all relevant facilities should be considered separately,
but this would lead to mu!ticollinearity  problems, not to mention making nonparametric
estimation practically  impossible. Median travel time to a market center or a cooperative
in the sample of 3,724 cultivating households is 2 hours (mean=2.8 hrs.). Median travel
11times are shorter on the plains of the Terai (1.25 hrs.) than in the Hills (2 hrs.) or
Mountains (3 hrs.).
Finally, it is necessary  to define a market area within which money prices (i.e., p,
v, and w ) do not vary. I take each district to be a distinct market; 73 out of the 75
districts in the country are represented in the NLSS sample and there are on average about
4 wards in a district (except in the oversampled Arun valley where this number is much
higher). Though somewhat arbitrary, identifying a market by a district is consistent with
evid.-ice from the village  questionnaires attached to the NLSS.  These data show that very
few villages have either market centers or agricultural cooperatives located in the same
ward; households living in several different wards share these facilities.
Analysis of Fertilizer Use and Crop Sales
If proximitv to markets influences land values through the effective prices of
agricultural inputs and outputs, then purchases of modem inputs and sales of output
should decline with distance from the market center.  According to the model, observed
fertilizer use per hectare, allowing for corner solutions, is x* = max{x(w, v,),0}.  A
similar equation holds for observed total crop sales per hectare, s*, except that sales also
depend on household consumption decisions. Analyzing marketed surplus (s* minus
consumption) is problematic because transport costs drive a wedge between selling and
purchase prices and net sellers respond differently to variation in these transport costs than
do net buyers (see, e.g., Omamo, 1998).  Examining crop sales alone focuses on the
selling decision, which is my primary interest.  It is also probably reasonable to assume
12that for net sellers consumption is relatively unresponsive to transport costs, given that
income and substitution effects work in opposite directions.
Figures 4 and 5 plot nonparametric regression estimates of fertilizer use per
hectare and crop sales per hectare, respectively, against travel time. The econometric
specification is similar to equation (9) and the sample consists of 3,712 cultivating
households. 7 Since both fertilizer use and crop sales are heavily censored at zero, I
estimate the first-.stage  models by tobit, in addition to OLS. 8 For the tobits, I drop
obsc.vations with perfect classification;  i.e., where all cases of a given value of h  or of a
given district are censored (167 observations for fertilizer, 6 for crop sales). 9 The second-
stage nonparamel:ric  regressions are estimated using the LOWESS smoother with
bandwidth=0.8.  The choice of smoother is dictated by its robustness to outliers and by the
fact that the 60 successive  values of h  are not equally spaced, which can lead to biases in
kernel regressions (Fan, 1992).
The figures show that fertilizer purchases and crop sales per hectare decline
steadily beyond travel times of about one hour.  It is unclear why the curves are increasing
for travel times of less than an hour, but one reason might be that cultivation is typically
less intensive near urban areas.  Also, comparing the curves based on OLS and tobit first-
stage regressions indicates that accounting for censoring makes little substantive
7Twelve  households  are dropped  because  they are uniquely  identified  by their district  and their value of h.
s The first-stage  parnmeter  estimates  are suppressed  for brevity. To summarize,  education  of the head and
the set of district  durnmies  are jointly  significant  in all regressions,  and the demographic  variables
(number  of adult males  and females  and male and female children),  included  only  in the crop  sales
equation  to capture  consumption  variation,  are also  jointly significant.
9The  high rate  of ce:nsoring  within certain districts  precludes  the use of semiparametric  methods  that are
robust  to deviations  from normality. In particular,  the censored  LAD estimator  fails to converge  when
13difference. In sum, this analysis supports the notion that transport costs influence  farm
profits through input use and crop marketing decisions.  The fertilizer result, in particular,
confirms the importance of the intensive margin of cultivation, implying  that the farm
profit function, and hence the rent function, should be convex.
Analysis of Plot Values  and Rents
Underlying the asset-pricing formula given by equation (8) are several strong
assun.r.tions about land and credit markets,'0 which may not hold in Nepal. To test
equation (8), along with the validity of self-reported plot values, I compare values with
rents received on plots that are leased out (mainly sharecropped).  My analysis  is based on
a sample of 381 plots that were either rented out during both agricultural seasons, or were
rented out in the wet (the main growing season) and left fallow in the dry. It should be
noted, however, that about twice this many plots (around six percent of all those owned)
were rented out during at least one season.  Net rents are summed across both seasons,
and include the value of in-kind payments while netting out the cost of inputs provided to
tenants.  The median rent to value ratio (p/V)  is 0.055, which can be viewed as an
estimate of the discount rate r.  Formally, I run the regression
log(V)=  7o  + 77q 1 09og(p)+4  (9)
and test whether r7,  = 1.
district  dummies  are  included  in the  specifications.  The  overall  rates  of censoring  in the  samples  are 43
percent  for  fertilizer  and  49  percent  for  sales.
10  For  example,  where  land  is the  sole  form  of collateral  for loans,  its price  may  reflect  its  collateral  value
in addition  to the  capitalized  value  of  the stream  of rents  (see  Chalamwong  and  Feder,  1988).
14Table 1 reports  a series  of estimators  of q, that make progressively  less  restrictive
assumptions  about  the form  of correlation  between log(p)  and  the error term 4. The
OLS estimate  in columnn  (1) assumes  that log(p)  and ; are uncorrelated,  and  it falls  well
short of unity. However, one reason for this low estimate could be attenuation bias due to
random measurement error in rents.  Specification (2) thus instruments rents with plot
area, which does indeed raise the estimate of 71, though it remains marginally  below unity.
Specification (3) corrects for the possibility that credit market conditions (i.e., log(r))  and
rents might covary across markets by including district fixed effects (using only districts
that contribute more than one plot to the sample);  i7j is still precisely estimated, but it is
no longer statistically  different from unity. Finally, specification (4) includes household
fixed effects, using the 90 households that contribute more than one plot to the sample.
This estimator correcr:s  for the possibility that household-specific interest rates and rents
are correlated, as wet[ as for any selection bias induced by restricting the sample to those
households that rent out land. This last estimate of  q, is again indistinguishable  from
unity, so that the maintained  assumptions of the asset- pricing model and of no systematic
reporting bias in plot values  cannot be rejected.
V.  Main  Results
Plot  Values and Distance to Market
Information is available on a total of 13,672 plots owned by 3,621 households.
Plot characteristics include suitability for rice cultivation (khet land), whether irrigated,
and if so whether seasonally  or year round, mode of irrigation (tubewell, canal, other),system of irrigation (self-managed, agency managed, community managed), and the
"quality" of the plot based on a four grade classification used by the land revenue
department for tax assessments. Land value is missing for 13 plots and quality for 98
plots, so the plot value regressions are based on 13,651 observations. However, when
predicting plot values  based on the regression results, these missing observations can be
recovered by imputing plot quality with its modal value.
Table 2 reports two specifications of the plot value regression. The first assumes
that  O(h) = h  and the second performs the first-stage in the semi-nonparametric
estimation described in Section HI. In both specifications, the plot characteristics have
significant and sensible  coefficients; for example, plots that are suitable for rice, plots with
year round irrigation," high quality plots, and, of course, larger plots are more valuable.
However, the value per-hectare specification (,/  = 1 in equation (9)) is resoundingly
rejected, which is important because plot size turns out to be negatively correlated with
distance to markets.  Thus, restricting /3  to one would have led to an underestimate of the
rate of decline of land values with travel time (Colwell and Munneke, 1997). As it is,
travel time is strongly negatively associated with land values.
Figure'6(a) plots the 9(h)  derived from the two specifications  in Table 2
(normalized by taking deviations from means). In the first case, O(h) = h 0 222, which is
obviously convex. The nonparametric estimate of O(h) (LOWESS; bandwidth=0.8) is
also roughly convex, except that the function is increasing above travel times of 12 hours,
l  Since irrigation  is an investment, which may be responsive to distance to market, I also ran the plot
value regressions unconditional on the irrigation variables.  In this case, the coefficient on log travel time
is -0.225  (0.0217), which is almost identical to its value of -0.222  in specification (1) of Table 2.
16though only  5 percent  of plots are located  this far from markets.  12 To formally  compare
the parametric  and  nonparametric  models,  I use the bootstrap, drawing  100  percent
random samples  in two stages,  first by sampling  plots within  households  and  then  by
sampling  households.  On each replication,  the two models  are run and  the difference  in
the slope of 9(h)  is calculated  at each value of h. As a test of whether  the actual  slope
differences  in Figure  6(a) are significantly  different  from zero, Figure  6(b)  plots,  at each h,
the ratio of the actual  slope  difference  to the standard deviation  over  the 100  bootstrap
replications. When  the absolute  value of this ratio exceeds  1.96,  the equality  of slopes  can
be rejected at the 5 percent  level. That  this hypothesis  is rejected  near  the endpoints  is
perhaps  not too surprising.  However,  the nonparametric  estimate  is also  significantly
steeper (more negatively  sloped)  than  the parametric  estimate  in much  of the one  to three
hour travel time range,  where  the data are most dense. Although  other parametric  models
might fit the data better,  this  test shows  that there is sufficient  power  to reject  a reasonable
parametric  alternative,  thus supporting  a nonparametric  approach.
Benefits and Distributional Consequences of Road Projects
The expected  appreciation  in value of a given plot as travel  time falls  from an
initial  value of h( to a value  of h, is
[b(hl) - 6(ho)] exp[6log(A)  + fX + SM]E[exp(u)]  (10)
The last term in this expression  takes into account unobserved  heterogeneity  in plot
values, and can be estimated  nonparametrically  as the average  exponentiated  residual  from
12 Bandwidth  choice  is subjective,  but the main features  of the nonparametric  fit are robust  to bandwidth.
17(9).  Although nonparainetric regression only provides an estimate of 0 at actual values of
h,  0(hl)  can be estimated by linear interpolation between known values of 0.  To
simulate the benefits from the road project discussed in Section II, let h, = ,uho for
ho < A and h1 = ho - A(I-v)  for ho 2 A . I set the value of ,  at 0.1 to reflect the fact
that the cost per ton-km of headloading in Nepal is roughly ten times the cost of
trucking." 3 Total household (capitalized) benefit from the project is simply  the sum of the
appreciations in value of each of the household's plots. 14
Following standard practice, I use total household consumption expenditures as a
measure of income and per-capita expenditures, adjusted for regional price differences, as
a measure of welfare.  Let us say that a road project is progressively (regressively)
targeted if the ratio of benefit to total household expenditures, the benefit ratio, is
decreasing (increasing) in per-capita expenditures.  Figure 9 plots nonparametric
regression curves (LOWESS; bandwidth=0.8) of benefit ratios against log per-capita
expenditures for three road projects, corresponding to three values of A. The estimates
are based on the full sample of 4,573 households, which includes both households who do
not cultivate and those who do not own land.  15
13 This number is based on information in Walters (1968), but it is still approximately valid according to
World Bank transport economists familiar with Nepal.
in the few cases  dihere  duc  ioii  i  Laaei  iiic  uceurs  on  uIe  icitesirfg  pol-auiu  of  9I, bI eEl  iSSCt
to zero.  Note that it is not possible to calculate benefits from the additional land brought under cultivation
as  h  increases.  However, as long as one considers a marginal road extension, these benefits are an
envelope phenomenon and hence are zero.
All statistics reported for this sample (e.g., the expenditure deciles in Figure 7) are calculated using
population weights to insure that they are nationally representative.  Ninety-three percent of the
households (on weighted basis) live in rural areas.
18Figure 7 shows  that as the road is extended  farther up the "representative>'  valley,
benefits are targeted  more  progressively.  Indeed,  the distribution  of benefits  from a short
road, one that extends  a mere 1.5 hours walking  time up the valley,  is slightly  regressive.
Sixty  percent of the sample  would  lie along such a road, whereas  85 percent  would  lie
along the 3-hour rioad and 98 percent would lie along the 8-hour road.  The key factor
behind the increasing progressivity is the strong tendency for poorer households to live
farther away from markets, as confirmed by the nonparametric regression curve in Figure
8.  E  idently, this factor dominates the opposing tendency of poorer households to have
less valuable landholdings,  also illustrated in Figure 8.
While suggestive,  Figure 7 does not address the question of whether the benefits of
a hypothetical road project are sufficiently large and distributed sufficiently  progressively
to reduce overall income  inequality. To tackle this question first requires converting the
capitalized benefits into a permanent income flow, which in tum requires an assumption
about the discount rate, r.  Suppose that current household expenditures equal permanent
income.  For a pure farm household, with no off-farm employment and which leases in no
land, permanent income equals rVrOT,L,  where  VrOTAL  is the sum of the value of all plots
owned; more generally,  income comes from other sources as well. Thus, in a regression
of total household expenditures on  VTOTALL,  the coefficient on VTOT,J  should equal the
discount rate r, with other sources of income consigned to the residual. A slight
refinement of this regression, which includes ward (village) fixed effects and which
instruments VTOT4L  for measurement error using total land area owned, gives r = 0.058
19with a standard error of 0.010.116  This estimate of the discount rate is remarkably  close to
that derived earlier from the rent to value ratio (i.e., 0.055).  In the calculations  that
follow, I set r = 0.06.
Denote household benefits per capita from a road of length A  by B(2).  Per capita
expenditures (permanent income) as a function of road length is thus  -(2) = ZO  + rB(2),
where  zo is baseline per capita expenditures.  Assuming that  y/(z) = z',  e> 0,  the
social welfare function (see (5)) can be written as W(2)  = [Y(A)(I - I(2))11c,  where  z  is
mean per capita expenditures and I  E [0,1] is Atkinson's measure of inequality.  17
Differentiating with respect to A gives
W'(2)  Z-(2)  I'(i)  (10)
W(A)  z-(A)  I1- I(A)
In other words, the rate of increase in social welfare as the road is extended can be
decomposed into the rate of increase in mean income and the rate of increase in income
equality, I - I.  An assessment of whether road building has important distributional
consequences can be made by comparing the magnitudes of these two components at
reasonable values of the inequality aversion parameter  c.  Specifically,  define
I(R-n  In  /(A  y  7(i  )  - Zn  1  i)  n)
1-10  /  I-IO 
16 7.1-  nT  cZ  Pzimat  5  5'  i  dent.  ^nlr--int fn-r -nmeSrm.mPnt  F-rTre  it  sihctnntii1,  smaller  at
0.0076 (0.0007).  These regressions are based on the sample of 3,621 households that own land.
Recall that I  1-  - I(z)i  for  S  lwhere N is the number of individuals.  When
=  1, W(A)  = log[F(A)(1 - I())],  where  I =  1-  i  (4 u-
20where the zero sulbscript  denotes values prior to the road project.  S2(A;  e)  represents the
contribution of reduced income inequality to the increase in social welfare from the
building of a road of length 2.
Figure 9 plots n(A;e)  using the Nepal data for  A 's ranging from 0.5 to 10 hours,
beyond which value practically  every household is on the road so that W'(2)  - 0. Note
that putting all households in the sample on a road would raise 5 by ten percent, quite a
substantial gain in permanent income.'8 Interestingly, at high values of inequality aversion
(  = 4 ),  building a short road actually increases income inequality ( Q < 0).  For any value
of  , the contribution of inequality reduction to the increase in social welfare rises with
the length of the road, again because of the strong tendency for the poor to live in more
remote areas. However, unless one chooses a value of e  above 2 or so, which is usually
considered rather large, the increase in social welfare is due overwhelmingly  to higher
mean income.  Rural road construction thus appears to be like a tide that lifts all boats
rather than a highly effective means of reducing income inequality.
VI.  Conclusion
Transport infrastructure  plays a central role in rural development,  but the
distributional consequences of rural roads have not received adequate theoretical or
empirical attentiorn. This paper develops and implements a method for nonparametrically
estimating the benefits from road projects at the househoid ievei and for examining  the
distribution of these benefits across income classes.  The findings for Nepal suggest that
18 Keep  in mind  that  because  I have  weighted  the sample  to represent  the  population  of  Nepal,  all of these
calculations  take  proper  account  of  the  fact  that  population  is less  dense  in more  remote  areas.
21providing  extensive  road access  to markets  would confer substantial  benefits  on average,
much of these going  to poor households. However,  the benefits  would  not be large
enough or targeted efficiently  enough  to appreciably  reduce income  inequality  in the
population  (unless  there is an exceptionally  high degree of inequality  aversion).  Thus,
while my analysis  may  paint  a more optimistic  picture than the World  Bank's  (1994, p. 80)
general assessment  that infrastructure  is "a blunt instrument  for intervening  directly  on
behalf  of the poor," rural  road construction  is certainly  not the magic  bullet  for poverty
allev ation.
Another  lesson  of this research  is that data on land  values  and  characteristics,
particularly  at the plot level,  can be extremely  useful  in measuring  the benefits  of
infrastructure  investments  in LDCs, and not just of rural roads. To be sure,  land  may  not
always behave  like  a typical  asset, so that benefit capitalization  may  be imperfect,  but the
asset-pricing  model  can be tested to determine  whether  the methodology  developed  in this
paper is appropriate  in a particular  context.
Finally,  it is important  to mention.the  other benefits  of rural  roads  besides  cheaper
transport to and from agricultural  markets,  such as better access  to schools  and health
facilities  and, more  generally,  to a greater variety  of consumer  goods. Insofar  as farmers
prefer to live  near their  farms,  at least some of these gains  are likely  to be capitalized  in
farmland  values. Separating  out these distinct  benefits  of rural roads is left as a topic for
future research.
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24Table 1
Plot Values and Rents
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
OLS  IV,  IVb  IVb
,i  0.658  0.825  1.047  1.034
StandardError  0.064a  0.108a  0.091  0.115
Ho 0 ill=  1 (p-value)  0.000  0.105  0.606  0.767
Fixed Effects  none  none  district  household
N  381  381  373  278
aRobust standard  error  accounts  for district-level  clustering.
bLog of plot area is the excluded  instrunent.
25Table 2
Plot Value Regressions
Means  (1)  (2)
Log(hours travel time)  3.47  -0.222
b  (4.01)a  (10.3)
Hzo:  S=  0 (p-value)  ---  0.0000
Log(area in hectares)  0.298  0.558  0.547
(1. 16)'  (37.8)  (37.4)
Suitable for rice (khet)  0.434  0.149  0.144
(3.89)  (3.84)
Irrigation:
seasonal  0.175  0.341  0.325
(4.55)  (4.47)
year-round  0.138  0.497  0.450
(6.29)  (5.88)
canal  0.239  0.060  0.052
(1.0)  (0.88)
tubewell  0.030  -0.034  -0.061
(0.41)  (0.74)
self-managed  0.189  -0.082  -0.051
(1.664)  (1.09)
agency managed  0.018  -0.219  -0.209
(1.663)  (1.67)
OQualitv:
dwaim  0.240  -0.250  -0.226
(5.27)  (5.02)
sim  0.304  -0.499  -0.465
(9.04)  (8.84)
chahar  0.365  -0.833  -0.792
(13.9)  (13.  9)
District dummies (p-value)  0.0000  0.0000
R2 0.546  0.568
Notes: Robust  t-values  accounting  for household-level  clustering  in parentheses.  Omitted  categories:
pakho/bari  (dry) for khet; non-irrigated  for irrigation;  other for irrigation  mode;  community  managed  for
irrigation management;  and awal (highest  grade)  for quality. Sample  size is 13,561  plots belonging  to
3,586  households.
aStatistics  are for levels. Standard  deviations  are in parentheses.
bJoint significance  of the dummy  variables  for each of the 60 values  of h.
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